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Track 37.1 
Abstract: In this paper, we empirically test the proposition that major innovation (MI) 
capabilities are systemic, dynamic capabilities. We rely on design theories and characterize 
the systemic, dynamic capabilities as design capabilities that renew a core of stabilized 
design rules.  
For the specific case of projects leading to new business development, we conducted a case-
control study of 46 historical projects; 26 of these led to new business development, and 20 
do not lead to new business development. Utilizing this sample, we show that our 
measurement model, based on rule-reuse vs. rule-renewal design capabilities, has a good fit. 
We find that rule-renewal design capabilities are positively related to new business 
development, whereas rule-reuse design capabilities (maintaining an invariant set of design 
rules) are independent of new business development. We discuss different combinations of 
rule-reuse and rule-renewal design capabilities.  
This paper contributes to the literature on MI capabilities. It also theoretically and 
methodologically contributes to the analysis of the dynamic capabilities of design activities.  
 
Keywords: major innovation, design capabilities, renewal design capabilities, history, 
project management principles 
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1- Introduction  
 
In her 2008 groundbreaking paper, Gina Collerelli O’Connor proposed that major innovation 
capabilities should be considered as dynamic capabilities and should be analyzed in a 
“systems approach” (O'Connor 2008). This proposition resulted from in-depth empirical case 
studies (O'Connor and DeMartino 2006) and suggested that a specific set of “routines” – so-
called "transformational routines" (O'Connor 2012) – determine major innovation, whereas 
non-transformational routines are not related to major innovation. Based on the most recent 
design theories, transformational routines may be analyzed as design capabilities that 
contribute to renew an invariant core of product development rules, whereas non-
transformational routines are design capabilities that contribute to preserve a core of invariant 
product development rules. As we will show below, this proposition generalizes many 
previous studies on “major” innovation management. It is also deeply consistent with most 
recent formal models of innovative design reasoning that offer a theoretical foundation for 
major innovation activities. However, there has been no empirical, statistical testing of the 
propositions. That is the aim of this paper.  
In the first section, we present the theoretical framework that grounds our hypotheses and 
builds our analytical criteria. In the second section, we detail our methodology that is based 
on the analysis of project management principles and their effect on new business creation. 
We build a case-control study of 46 historical projects; of these, 26 led to new business 
development and 20 did not lead to new business development. Using this sample, we show 
that our measurement model has a good fit; we test that the “preservation” design capabilities 
are independent of new business development, whereas renewal design capabilities are 
positively related to new business development. In the third section, we discuss different 
combinations of renewal and preservation in our sample. We conclude with the managerial 
implications of this work. 
 
2- Research background, research hypotheses and methodological issues 
2.1 Major innovation capabilities in light of design theory 
Major innovation and dynamic capabilities. After many debates about the definitions of 
innovation (radical (Leifer et al. 2000), disruptive (Christensen 1996), really new (Garcia and 
Calantone 2002), etc.), major innovation was proposed to characterize forms of innovation 
with high uncertainty over multiple dimensions (market or technology) that transform existing 
markets or industries or create new ones that require approaches that differ from those used in 
incremental innovation (O'Connor 2008).  
For O’Connor (2008), the capabilities required for major innovation are dynamic capabilities, 
i.e., “strategic and organizational processes that create value for firms within dynamic 
markets by manipulating resources into new value-creating strategies” (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). In the case of MI, these dynamic capabilities are specified in terms of process 
and are linked to “structural, cultural, skill-set and strategic elements” (p. 317), i.e., they can 
only be understood in a “system approach” that characterizes the MI “management system” 
(O'Connor 2008). O’Connor (2008) then builds on the notion of “system” to propose that the 
following seven elements characterize “MI dynamic capabilities”: 1) a clearly identified 
organizational structure, 2) internal and external interface mechanisms, 3) exploratory 
processes, 4) requisite skills, 5) appropriate governance and decision-making mechanisms and 
criteria, 6) appropriate metrics, and 7) a cultural and leadership context. Thus, dynamic 
capabilities extend beyond repeatable processes and can be identified as more complex 
activities. However, they are difficult to observe because each part must be analyzed in 
relation to the other parts and in relation to the entire system.  
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Design activity and design theory. To overcome this difficulty, another way to analyze 
“systems” is to characterize the logic of their actions (Hatchuel 2005). This will also help to 
clarify certain terminology linked with “dynamic capabilities”; dynamic capabilities seem to 
lead to certain forms of contradiction because they require routines, i.e., “codifiable, 
repeatable and generalizable processes”, and routines are often thought to breed inertia 
(Hannan and Freeman 1989; King and Tucci 2002) unless there are certain routines that 
preserve ongoing change process “on a higher order” (Benner and Tushman 2003; Winter 
2000). However, how do these “higher order” routines avoid inertia themselves? The 
difficulty emerges from the models implicitly used for describing rule emergence; these 
figures of speech are linked to the decision making paradigm used to characterize the firm – 
be it behavioral (Cyert and March 1963), rational or bounded rational – routines facilitate or 
constrain decision making, they “enlighten” the (possibly bounded) rational choice or they 
constrain the actors who are merely effort optimizers and tend to re-use the routines they 
already know that have been effective in the past (March et al. 2000). The decision-making 
paradigm discusses the forms, constraints and effectiveness of choices, but it tends to oversee 
or simplify the logic of rule emergence, which is often assimilated in the natural process of 
mutation and selection. In this model, only strange mutations and adaptations to external 
conditions can explain the renewal of rules. Dynamic capabilities are thus described as 
“routines” that “control” mutations and adaptations – but what controls the mutations and 
adaptations of these higher order routines?  
By contrast, MI consists actually of creating new products (services) and new competencies, 
new markets and new meaning – it corresponds to a design logic (Hatchuel 2005; Hatchuel et 
al. 2010), and it might be easier to analyze MI in a design paradigm. Indeed, recent advances 
in Design Theory have helped clarify the critical relations between decision making and 
design (Hatchuel et al. 2012). Decision making consists of adopting one rule from a set of 
possible rules according to a set of known criteria (e.g., problem solving (Simon 1979), 
statistical decision making under uncertainty (Wald 1950; Raïffa 1968), psychological bias in 
decision making (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), behavioral decision making, etc.), whereas 
design consists of creating new rules to create a new object that partially meets known criteria 
and that is unknown at the beginning of the process (Yoshikawa 1989; Shai and Reich 2004; 
Hatchuel and Weil 2009). It is important to note that "unknown" means more than “ill-defined” 
or “wicked” problems (Schön 1990). It does not indicate that the object is here but cannot be 
identified; instead, it indicates that certain attributes characterizing the object cannot be 
articulated at the beginning of the process, such as a “hypersonic and environment friendly 
aircraft”. Likewise, "unknown" is not uncertain; uncertainty is characterized by a probability 
space in which the events are known, but its probability of occurrence makes it uncertain. For 
instance, tomorrow's weather is uncertain. By contrast, unknown means that certain attributes 
of the object are unknown; the forms that extra-terrestrial life might take are unknown. As a 
consequence, there can be some decision in design and design in decision but a design process 
cannot be assimilated into a form of decision making. Nevertheless, it has been shown that 
there is a form of rationality in design that is “expandable” (Hatchuel 2002). Thus, with 
design, we have a model of activity that integrates the logic of rule creation into a rational 
model. It also leads to modeling various forms; expandable rationality can be consequential 
(e.g., try to be as original as possible, try to generate as many solutions as possible, etc.) or 
procedural (always use identical design competences), it can maximize the explorations or 
minimize costs, etc. 
 
Design capabilities. Thus, there are specific routines in design that will support or constrain 
the design process. For instance, recent research in cognitive science has shown the so-called 
fixation effect in design that leads designers to explore only limited areas of the unknown 
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(Jansson and Smith 1991). This type of bias was also identified in collective processes such as 
brainstorming in which social influences tend to limit the capacity of the group to explore the 
unknown (Paulus et al. 2002). In the design model, these biases are similar to cognitive traps 
in the decision-making process (re-using the same routine for every problem, which leads to 
suboptimal solutions); in design, the fixation consists in reusing routines that impede the 
generation of new alternatives. Conversely, it has been shown that collective action in design 
might be supported by so called “unlocking” rules that force the group to overcome the limits 
of fixation (Le Masson et al. 2011c). Such “unlocking rules” have been visible in artistic 
milieux; it has been shown that artistic or industrial design education actually consists in 
learning rules to “unlock” students and helping them to overcome individual or collective 
fixation (see, in particular, the analysis on Bauhaus teaching in (Droste 2002; Le Masson et al. 
2011b)). Even engineering design might be analyzed as the development of rules to support 
the exploration of the unknown, as “languages of the unknown” (Le Masson and Weil 2012).  
Thus, in a design perspective, the logic of rule creation is modeled as a design activity; the 
routines that organize activity are design capabilities, and these design capabilities may be 
capabilities for rules creation. Returning to dynamic capability for major innovation, we 
propose that these design capabilities can be analyzed as “high-order” capabilities supporting 
action. Moreover, one of the interesting outcomes of research on design theory is helpful for 
our work on MI. Indeed, historical and formal studies on design methods and organizations 
have helped to characterize two logics in design that have led to the creation of the following 
specific capabilities (Le Masson and Weil 2012; Kroll 2012; Reich et al. 2010; Karniel and 
Reich 2011):  
 
1) On the one hand, there is the necessity to avoid too much exploration, i.e., to 
stabilize the system. In design logic, the creation of rules is the logical 
consequence of design activity. This is the re-use of existing rules that requires 
a specific capability1. Thus, to maximize certain forms of efficiency, a first set 
of collective design capabilities consists in identifying, preserving and reusing 
an invariant core of rules as much as possible. These are so-called “rule-reuse 
design capabilities”, i.e., design capabilities dedicated to the preservation of a 
set of rules. What can the set of invariant rules consist of? Similarly, what can 
be predefined and will not be changed by the design process (invariant by 
design)? Historical models tend to list the following four main invariants to 
stabilize a form of “dominant design” or “non-major innovation”:  
a. An invariant target: the types of customer requirements (eg “braking 
distance” for a car) are fixed – only the level can be changed (“less than 
xx meters at 100km/h); the firm avoids the development of new types 
of functional requirements for specific customers. This invariant 
corresponds to stable market representation and is often considered a 
market cognitive trap (see also (Christensen 1996; Govindarajan et al. 
2011)), but it has also been a way to avoid unnecessary product 
diversity, historically.  
                                                 
1 This is one of the strongest differences with an approach based on the decision-making paradigm (behavioral 
or rational); the model of decision making exhibits a “rational heuristic” to obtain optimal (or satisfying) 
decisions. The issue is choosing the best heuristic. The behavioral model underlines that people and 
organizations tend to use “exploitation” rules to solve problems. In a design paradigm, these tendencies are only 
one small part of all the “reuse” strategy; from a design point of view, even the “framing” of the design issue 
into a “problem” with clear and fixed goals and set constraints is a way to limit the creation of new rules because 
it avoids the discovery of new goals (and new constraints) during the process. 
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b. Invariant competencies (re-use technical skills). This is often 
considered a capability cognitive trap, but it is also a strategy to avoid 
the unnecessary creation of competences.  
c. Invariant people resources (re-use identical people in identical 
networks). This may also be interpreted as an organizational cognitive 
trap, but it is also a strategy to avoid the (costly) creation of new 
networks, organizations and relationships.  
d. Invariant list of possible risks (a preconceived list of anticipated risks). 
There might be uncertainty, but the list of uncertain events is 
unchanged – only the level of uncertainty is changed. Thus, the set of 
tests used to evaluate the robustness of the design can be reused to 
avoid the development of specific robustness criteria and tests (see the 
notion of “known unknown” in (Sommer et al. 2008)). 
In design theory, this perspective is characterized as rule-based design (Le Masson et al; 
2012). 
 
2) On the other hand, collective design may be organized to intentionally renew 
the same set of rules regularly; there are design capabilities to renew the 
invariant core. These are so-called “rule-renewal design capabilities”. These 
capabilities can be deduced systematically; capabilities of exploring new types 
of specifications, capabilities of exploring new competencies, capabilities of 
identifying new design partners, and capabilities of identifying new types of 
risk. This is the logic of innovative design (ibid.). These capabilities may also 
be linked to the following MI capabilities that are identified by O’Connor in a 
systems approach:  
a. The identification of new customer specifications and the identification 
of risk are linked to capabilities for exploratory processes (#3) and 
appropriate governance and decision making mechanisms and criteria 
(#5).  
b. The exploration of new competencies is related to exploratory 
processes (#3) and requisite skills (#4).  
c. The identification of new partners related to “identified organizational 
structures” (#1) and “internal and external interface mechanisms” (#2).  
Notably, these criteria help to check the consistency of the “observation”; it is not 
necessary to exhaustively describe every aspect of “innovation organization” (an 
issue raised by MI dynamics identified in a system approach). Instead, an 
acceptable picture might be obtained by describing the capabilities contributing to 
evolve the set of design rules. Another remark: despite a strong convergence, there 
is one slight difference between the system approach and the design approach in 
the sense that O’Connor (2008) insists on the fact that these capabilities will 
contribute to “stabilize” the system (the logic of homeostasis), whereas the design 
framework leads to characterize capabilities that stabilize a dynamic trajectory of 
the system – a logic of intentional system change.  
Therefore, in a design perspective, it is possible to analyze MI dynamic capabilities by 
identifying the underlying invariant core of design rules and the capabilities used to manage 
the core, whether to preserve the core (rule-reuse design capability) or to renew it (rule-
renewal design capability).  
 
2.2 Methodological issue – observing projects routines and new business development 
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O’Connor (2008) proposed that MI capabilities are systemic, dynamic capabilities. Based on 
the design perspective, systemic, dynamic capabilities are considered as rule-renewal (RN) 
design capabilities; and we can identify systemic non-dynamic capabilities that are rule-reuse 
(RR) design capabilities. Thus, the research hypothesis becomes that RN design capabilities 
contribute to MI, whereas MI is independent of RR design capabilities.  
Testing these two research questions requires observing RR and RN design capabilities., i.e., 
observing the stabilized core and its evolution towards a new stabilized core. This raises at 
least three critical methodological issues, which are the following:  
- How can design capabilities be observed? For March, rules observation should ideally 
be limited to written rules. For Zollo and Winter (2002), capabilities are characterized 
by “codifiable, repeatable, generalizable” routines; they are a “learned and stable 
pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically generates 
and modifies its operating routines”.  
- How can MI be measured and, in the design perspective, how can a stable core that is 
successful be ensured? The observation cannot be limited to one punctual success. The 
new stable core should actually give birth to a new business development in which the 
range of products is a major innovation compared to other products. Thus, there are 
two issues, ensuring that the range is a “major innovation” and ensuring that it relies 
on a new stable core.  
- How will  the relationship between design capabilities and MI be constructed? There 
must be a unit of analysis in which we can observe design capabilities and observe 
related changes in a core of design rules.  
To meet these requirements, we rely on one specific observation method, i.e., we study 
projects and their relationship to new business development. We explain the advantages of 
this observation method (and its intrinsic limits) below.  
- Observing at the level of the project helps to identify design capabilities, we are able 
to analyze management routines (principles and practices) of a project inside an 
organization. This is supported by clear project management principles that are used to 
organize the process; thus, there are explicit routines (codified), these routines are 
used consistently with the project (repeatability) and these project management 
principles are also considered to be valid on a broader scale (because they are the 
project principles of the related organization) (hence generalizability). By doing so, 
we miss certain types of routines discussed by O’Connor (e.g., the organization at the 
portfolio level or an organization managing innovative projects). There is one 
observation bias, which is that we identify only certain capabilities. For instance, we 
would oversee cases in which MI occurs through project portfolio management 
without any RN design capabilities at the project level. However, the bias leads to an 
underestimation of the role of RN design capabilities in MI. This is a non-differential 
bias that leads to an underestimation of the relationship. If we prove the relationship 
despite the bias, the quality of the result is maintained.  
- We do not measure MI at the project level. It is accepted that MI cannot be observed 
at the level of one project (see longitudinal studies on major innovations: (Leifer et al. 
2000; Van de Ven et al. 1999)); the consequences appear much later in other projects 
derived from the “innovative” one. We measure MI at the level of the stream of 
products and projects that can possibly be related to the initial “innovative” project 
(Maidique & Zirger, 1990). Thus, we observe MI as new business development 
(NBD).  
- Thus, the project provides a clear unit of analysis. On the one hand, we observe design 
capabilities at the project level; on the other hand, we observe new business 
 7 
development by analyzing the long-term consequences of the project inside the 
organization.  
 
2.3. Research hypothesis in the observation framework 
Our hypotheses were that RN design capabilities contribute to MI and that MI is independent 
of RR design capabilities. We will test these hypotheses in the context of project management 
and NBD. Notably, these hypotheses find many echoes in the literature on project 
management, innovation and NBD.  
The literature on Project Management has long identified key capabilities that contribute to 
New Product Development success (see for instance the synthesis in (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995)), clear initial vision and clear problems to solve (Imai et al. 1985) (Clark and Fujimoto 
1991) (Wheelwright and Clark 1992) (PMI 2004), careful planning, uncertainty front loading 
to avoid the late discovery of surprises, integrated teams with relevant competences and clear 
work divisions (Myers and Marquis 1969) (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987, 1993) (Zirger and 
Maidique 1990) (PMI 2004). These capabilities are related to the following dimensions to 
characterize a design core: invariant targets (a clear set of customer requirements), invariant 
competencies, invariant people (a stable project team, a clear work division) and an invariant 
set of anticipated risks. Notably, these factors are all related to organized capabilities to re-use 
existing design rules; thus, they are RR design capabilities. In the literature, these capabilities 
are not self-evidently related to new business development; by contrast, new business 
development requires learning, exploration, risk taking, evolving teams and commitment and 
dynamic competences (Van de Ven & al., 1999; O’Connor & al, 2008). These capabilities are 
said to contribute to optimal new product development success and limit useless learning; 
they focus on clear Quality-Cost-Delay targets and involve the right people to reach this well-
established target. Thus, our first research hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H1a: In Project Management, RR design capabilities may be characterized as capabilities to 
stabilize a target value, to efficiently use a set of given competencies, to stabilize work 
divisions and to address well-anticipated risks.  
 
H1b: RR design capabilities are independent of the success of new business development.  
 
The literature on innovation and project management helps identify another set of critical 
capabilities for the successful management of exploratory projects, and these design 
capabilities may be analyzed according to the following dimensions of the invariant core of 
design rules (i.e., invariant list of anticipated risk, invariant competence, invariant people, and 
invariant targets):  
1- Beyond the logic of robustness of a set of anticipated risks, innovative projects must 
prepare for unforeseeable uncertainties (or unknown unknowns) (Loch et al. 2006; 
Sommer et al. 2008); they can even maximize the exploration of the unknown on a 
certain issue, for instance identifying the options that maximize variance (Fredberg 
2007; Lenfle and Loch 2010; Adner and Levinthal 2004). 
2- Beyond the logic of validating well-known solutions based on identified competencies, 
the exploration is based on creative (but rigorous) methods that help break critical 
design rules, either through fuzzy front-end phases (Koen et al. 2001; Reid and De 
Brentani 2004), systematic investigations (Tidd et al. 1997; Verganti 2008) or strongly 
deviant explorations (frequently described as “moon-landing” initiatives), to let be 
surprised by the results in an organized “reflexive” way (Schön 1990; Le Masson et al. 
2011a; Sutton and Hargadon 1996; McGrath 2001). 
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3- Beyond an integrated team with clear work divisions, the innovation project team is 
also able to connect, involve and commit relevant stakeholders over time (Akrich et al. 
2002; Van de Ven et al. 1999) or even create a disruptive community in its ecosystem 
that will support the development of the entire business (Le Masson et al. 2011c). 
4- Beyond a clear list of requirements and well-defined specifications, the innovative 
project might require a capacity to “make sense” of different value perspectives (Thiry 
2001) or even require a value management (Hatchuel et al. 2005) (Gillier and Hooge 
2012) that manages multiple, interdependent exploration alternatives to create multiple 
and varied types of values (Elmquist and Le Masson 2009; Loch et al. 2006; Van de 
Ven et al. 1999). 
These are RN design capabilities, and they are related to successful NBD. Thus, the second 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H2a: In Project Management, RN design capabilities can be characterized as capabilities to 
address the unknown (or unforeseeable uncertainties), to break design rules and acquire 
competencies, to modify team composition and project stakeholders and to explore and create 
new target values.  
 
H2b: RN design capabilities positively affect the success of new business development.   
 
If H1 and H2 are true, this raises an interesting problem because we should find successful 
projects that combine rule-renewal design capabilities and rule-reuse design capabilities. How 
can these capabilities be combined? The literature on ambidextrous organizations has long 
predicted this phenomenon (Duncan 1976; Tushman et al. 1997). Research on project 
management analyzed it at the level of projects and suggested a large variety of organizational 
forms (Shenhar 2001; Shenhar and Dvir 2007; Pich et al. 2002; Lenfle and Loch 2010). Our 
study confirms this variety. This will be our third research question. 
 
3- Research methodology and empirical material:  a case-control study on 46 well-
documented historical cases  
 
To test these hypotheses, we require rich empirical data on the project itself to analyze the 
management dimensions discussed above (risk management, learning strategy, value 
management and organization) and we must perform long-term analyses of new business 
creation. Thus, following (Kieser 1994; Pettigrew 1990), we favor historical data. Historical 
data have previously been used on single innovative projects (Lenfle and Loch 2010; Lenfle 
2011). In this paper, we attempt to generalize these single case results to a large sample of 46 
well-documented historical cases.  
We conducted a case-control study, with 26 cases that led to new business development and 
20 control cases (projects without new business development). This method has good 
statistical power because cohort studies, with which the case-control method is often 
contrasted, must wait for a 'sufficient' number of ‘case’ events (new business development) to 
accrue, which would have been costly in our situation.  
 
3.1. Case selection;  
We selected 26 historical cases, in which there was detailed written material available, and in 
which each case combined two critical features: there was a recognized development of a new 
business, and this new business development was associated with a project. We selected 
twenty control cases in which there was a project that did not lead to new business 
development.  
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To assess the existence of a project was easy because the authors of the cases themselves 
discussed it clearly.  
To assess the “new business development” variable, we used two criteria. First, we researched 
where there are “descendants” of the initial project, i.e., products/services sharing similar 
functions, technologies and architectures. For instance, the initial nylon stockings were 
followed by several derivatives that built a family of product that shared common values 
(robust, light, fashionable,…) and common technologies (the nylon fiber and its associated 
technologies) that progressively built a dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback 1978), 
with regular improvements. In each case, we analyze whether a “lineage” of products and 
competencies emerges after the initial proposal. The second criteria is an organizational one: 
we check whether the new business is associated with a new business unit or even with new 
department in the organization. In the case of nylons, a new department emerged, in charge of 
polymer products, and the new corporate research lab acquired such a strong legitimacy that it 
became institutionalized in the Du Pont organization.  
In practice, the three authors assess independently the variables, following a classic 5-level 
Likert scale (from -2 – strong disagree- to + 2 –strongly agree) (see detailed questions and 
assessment criteria in appendix).  
Notably, these criteria led us to skip one case, Apollo. We initially selected Apollo as a 
relevant case because of the apparently high legacy of the project (from Apollo 1 to Apollo 
17). However, careful investigations led us to consider that there were only few missions that 
followed the success of Apollo 11, and these were all mainly a copy of the first one (except 
for the Lunar Rover) with no improvement and with no logic of business growth through 
improvement and variety. Moreover, there were limited transfers from the Apollo project to 
later NASA projects (in particular, historians report that Apollo had no effect on the Shuttle 
projects). For this reason, we did not consider Apollo a relevant case of new business 
development.  
 
The above-mentioned criteria helped to address one critical issue when relying on historical 
cases, i.e., how long should one wait before one considers a case as relevant? Should one fix a 
standard duration (e.g., “more than twenty years”)? We prefer to consider that the relevant 
duration was created by the product development time specific to the lineage in question, e.g., 
for automotive innovation, innovations such as telematic services or athermic windshields are 
likely to be implemented for each new car development project launched by the car 
manufacturer, i.e., typically, one or two per year. Thus, after a couple of years, it is possible to 
know whether a lineage is installed or not. For this reason, we use relatively contemporary 
cases, such as Tefal or PSA because it is possible to assess lineage success.  
Based on identical criteria, we selected the control cases. We found the control cases in 
historical books. To ensure that these cases were not at the origin of a lineage of products, we 
used the same historical logic of following the long term. Moreover, from time to time, we 
were able to identify cases that were actually inside a lineage created by one of our “new 
business development” cases (see Saint-Gobain windshields) or in the same organization (see, 
for instance, the Poseidon and Trident cases). We also relied on studies such as (Clark and 
Fujimoto 1991), which are powerful syntheses of several project management cases.  
 
In such a process, we had to assure observer objectivity. In quantitative studies based on 
questionnaires, it is common to separate either the people making the study and the one 
making the analysis or to separate the questionnaire into two parts – one on the dependent 
variables and the other on the independent variables – and administered by two different 
persons (e.g., (Lichtenthaler 2009)). These methods are typically used because the results 
depend almost solely on the data gathered through the questionnaire, and the issue is typically 
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to triangulate the data with other sources. In our case, we could strongly triangulate because 
we rely on much richer material than interviews because we could use complete history 
written by expert historians or in-depth and comprehensive case studies. Thus, for each data 
point, we had access to a quantity and quality of data that often far exceeded that gleaned 
from typical questionnaires.  
Conversely, qualitative study recommends separating data gathering and coding, on the one 
hand, and data analysis, on the other (Yin 2003) (see for instance (Santos and Eisenhardt 
2009)). We were able to follow this recommendation because we separated the data gathered 
by the case historians from the analysis we performed. Moreover, the historical data we use 
are all published in English so that the reader can refer to the primary material if he wishes.  
The list of cases and the published references are given in table 1 in the appendix.  
 
3.2 Project management descriptors  
For each case, we analyzed the RN and RR design capabilities of the project management, 
according to the main variables identified in the literature review provided above. We 
describe each as grouped into the following four classical organizational dimensions 
corresponding to the four dimensions of an invariant core of design rules: managing risks 
(invariant set of anticipated risk), managing learning (invariant competencies), managing a 
team (invariant people), and managing target value (invariant target type). We detail below 
these descriptors. In italics, we write the assessment to be accepted or rejected by analyzing 
the case. The descriptors are not mutually exclusive (for instance, in case of learning, some 
parts of the project can be based on validation, whereas other parts may be exploratory; see 
Lenfle & Loch, 2010).  
 
1- Process organization for managing risk (invariant anticipated risks).  
1. Organize a planned process that is robust to a set of anticipated external events 
(technological and market uncertainties); in the case of surprise, it should react and 
continue to meet the target. This is the classical project robustness criteria. For 
instance, in the case of the F117-Stealth Fighter at Lockheed skunkworks, the authors 
state, “evidence of good contingency planning […] included actions taken to recover 
from […]”. (p. 162) (Rich and Janos 1994). 
2. The project prepares for unforeseeable uncertainties (unk unk) and/or the project 
organizes to increase the variety of options.  
The first part of the proposal refers to criteria introduced by Loch et al. (2001; 2006). 
It takes the form of a sophisticated sequential and parallel testing of different solutions. 
The Manhattan Project clearly exhibits this feature (Lenfle and Loch 2010).  
The second part of the sentence refers to the fact that, in the logic of real option 
pricing, the value of innovative projects increased with the variety of technological 
and market scenarios they might address such that risk management consisted in 
exploring the largest technological and market span (and not merely the most “feasible” 
and “marketable” alternatives) (O'Connor 2008; Adner and Levinthal 2004; Fredberg 
2007; Lenfle and Loch 2010). The Manhattan Project also exhibits this feature because 
several explorations within the project did not aim at validating a technological path 
but did aim at exploring the technological potential opened by the path (Lenfle and 
Loch 2010).  
The first type of risk management (RR design capabilities) is based on the fact that there is an 
anticipated set of risks (and risk management is based on these risks), whereas the second 
type of risk management (RN design capabilities) consists in preparing for unknown 
unknowns (unk unks) that require the creation of new rules.  
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2- Managing project costs and resources associated with learning (invariant competences).  
1. Project learning costs are related to tests and validation (based on existing 
competencies); alternatives are tested and evaluated and the most relevant (or the 
best) one is kept. This approach is at the root of project planning and project-as-
problem-solving (Imai et al. 1985; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Wheelwright and Clark 
1992). Edison Electric Lighting or the Polaris Missile comprised many such 
technological validations. Such a validation logic is possible when the technological 
evaluation criteria are well identified in advance (i.e., one can identify such a list of 
technologies and validation criteria at the beginning of the project). 
2. Project learning (a) uses deviant explorations to be surprised by the results of such 
explorations and/or (b) uses systematic, comprehensive investigations and/or (c) uses 
a fuzzy front-end creative phase. 
a- The first part of the sentence refers to “reflexive” learning, which is more than 
serendipity in the sense that it is a provoked surprise (Schön 1990; Le Masson et al. 
2011a; Sutton and Hargadon 1996; McGrath 2001). The polymer synthesis in Du Pont 
corporate research lab initially followed such logic because it was intended only to 
create new fibers that were never observed before without any guarantee of success.  
b- The second part of the sentence is relevant when there is an organized design of 
experiments that is close to a traditional “experimental research” logic (Tidd et al. 
1997; Verganti 2008). Edison researched a “good” filament for incandescent lamps by 
following this logic and systematically trying almost all existing fibers.  
c- The third part of the sentence refers to a preliminary phase that helps to identify 
multiple paths, including the “moon landing” or crazy paths (Koen et al. 2001; Reid 
and De Brentani 2004). The Polaris Missile exhibits such a phase that further led to 
clear distinctions between two types of tasks, one in which a validation logic was 
sufficient and one in which a more exploratory logic was required.  
The first type of learning (RR design capabilities) consists of validating existing routines 
against existing performance criteria, whereas the second learning management (RN design 
capabilities) consists of creating new competencies and/or new performance criteria.  
 
3- Coordination means to manage the project team and project environment (invariant 
people).  
1. The project team is integrated, stable and exhibits clear work divisions. The 
relationship with the external environment is well codified. (Myers and Marquis 1969; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987, 1993; Zirger and Maidique 1990). Serious 
development teams are clear examples of this type of organization (Clark & Fujimoto, 
1991).  
2. The project team (a) is able to commit new (initially external) actors to its network 
and/or (b) is able to change its own ecosystem by motivating external actors to create 
knowledge and competencies to contribute to the future lineage.  
(a) The first part of the sentence refers to the criteria of an innovation team that were 
introduced by Actor Network Theory (ANT) research (Akrich et al. 2002); these 
criteria insisted on the necessity of mobilizing external resources (suppliers, research 
labs, etc.) and to “translate” the project to adapt to the needs of multiple stakeholders, 
beyond the project customer. The Edison lighting case successfully involved new 
actors in the innovator network (Akrich et al. 2002) (the authors use (Hughes 1983)).  
(b) The second part of the sentence refers to a criterion in which the initial project 
team is “enlarged” for including new stakeholders. In this latter case, the project team 
only stimulates knowledge creation in the ecosystem that is likely to support the 
development of the new business (Le Masson et al. 2011c; Le Masson et al. 2009). For 
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instance, the development of the Toyota Prius pushed several actors in the ecosystem 
to launch multiple attempts to become competent in power-electronics and energy 
storage.  
The first type of team management (RR design capabilities) (the first part of the sentence) 
requires stable rules to be able to define ex ante the people to be involved and the tasks to be 
assigned to each team member. By contrast, the second type of team management (RN design 
capabilities) (the second part of the sentence) insists on the capacity to adapt the configuration 
of the team (and the related network and ecosystem) to the discovery of new issues.  
 
4- Managing target value (invariant type of target). 
1. The project target value is given by a clear list of requirements and well-defined 
specifications. This helps to organize value division inside the project and project 
suppliers. The existence of this list of specification is typically easy to assess. For 
example, in the development of the F-117-Stealth, “the project was tailored to the 
specific needs of the program objectives” (p. 162) (Miller 1995). 
2. Project target value (a) requires "sense-making" during the project and/or (b) is created 
during the project.  
(a) The first part of the sentence indicates that the value is not given at the beginning but 
results from the progressive aggregation of initially scattered interests (Thiry 2001); in 
the end, the value is unified. For example, in the Edison Lighting project, the value of 
light, compared to gas lighting, was only progressively identified. In the Manhattan 
Project, the true value of the multiple technological alternatives were identified only late 
in the process after the multiple technological alternatives began to be combined (Lenfle 
2011). 
(b) Contrary to the first part of the sentence, in which the value was present but is 
identified and aggregated during the process, the second part considers that some value is 
designated during the process, with the logical consequence that there are often multiple, 
contrasted and even contradictory values that are created during the process and that only 
one is embodied in the final project. (Van de Ven et al. 1999; Hatchuel et al. 2005; Gillier 
and Hooge 2012; Elmquist and Le Masson 2009; Loch et al. 2006). For instance, the 
Toyota Prius project revealed that hybrid engines could be related to a new type of “fun 
driving” instead of only the fuel consumption reduction. This further led to the 
development of hybrids for 4-wheee drive cars that have high average fuel consumption.  
The first type of value management is based on target values fixed exogenously and that 
remain stable during the project (RR design capabilities). The project is not in charge of 
exploring the value itself. The second type of value management is based on the exploration 
of new values during the project (RN design capabilities).   
 
In the independent variables that describe managerial actions to manage a project, one can 
distinguish RR design capabilities that are based on fixed design rules (1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1) 
(realizing existing lists of specifications (while remaining robust to well-identified risks), 
learning through empirical testing and organizing an integrated, stable project team with clear 
work divisions), whereas the other set of variables corresponds to RN design capabilities.  
 
For each case, we check the success of new business development with the two indicators 
below:  
A- Lineages. There is a family of products/services that is new and associated with the 
first project. We provide additional indications to answer the above assessment.  
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a. Criteria for newness: see criteria of O’Connor et al. for major innovation 
(O'Connor 2008); other indicators may be added, such as new product name 
(e.g., Hybrid Synergy drive in the case of Toyota Prius).  
b. Criteria for family: several derivatives with several generations (e.g., Prius 
models 1 to 4 and derivatives such as Lexus hybrids) and regular 
improvements and changes in a logic of dominant design (Abernathy and 
Utterback 1978).  
c. Criteria of association: The first product is used as a reference or the 
competencies created at the occasion of the first product are widely reused for 
following projects (e.g., the competencies acquired during the Manhattan 
Project are reused and improved in other nuclear weapons) (Maidique and 
Zirger 1985).  
B- New organizations supporting the new family of products. There is a new 
organization that contributes to the new business development. We provide additional 
indications to answer the above assessment. 
a. Criteria for new organizations: new business unit, new function (invention of 
corporate research labs, of skunk works, etc.), that contribute significantly to 
the lineage of products over time and with relative stability.  
b. Criteria for newness: the organization was not here at the beginning of the 
project (we follow here the “misalignment” criteria of Leifer et al. (Leifer et al. 
2000)). 
All these criteria correspond to the existence of a (new and invariant) set of design rules.  
 
We also add the following control variables that are often mentioned for new business 
development:  
a- Is there an established dominant design at the beginning of the project in the project 
field? This parameter controls for the possibility that the existence of a dominant 
design would impede the development of new business development (lock-in effect).  
b- What is the relative size of the project organization compared to the entire 
organization? This parameter controls for the fact that a project that is relatively small 
compared to the rest of the organization might be less likely to elicit the emergence of 
a new business in the organization.  
 
3.3. Analysis 
We first test the factors (the latent variables, i.e., “rule-reuse” vs. “rule-renewal” factors) 
through a confirmatory factorial analysis for the measurement model. We use Stata 11 with 
the confa package (developed by S. Kolenikov et al. (Kolenikov 2009)). To test H1 and H2, 
we conduct a logistic regression using two categories based on the latent variables (“rule-
reuse_high” vs. “rule-reuse_low” to test H1; and “rule-renewal_high” vs. “rule-renewal_low” 
to test H2). We take into account the control variables. It appeared that a SEM was not 
necessary – the “case-control” logic brought enough power to the test based on the logistic 
regression.  
We then conducted a complementary empirical analysis on the cases that exhibit both good 
RN design capabilities and good RR design capabilities. For the cases in these configurations, 
we analyzed the strategies elaborated to combine good rule-renewal and good rule-reuse in a 
project.  
 
4- Main results 
4.1 Example of a project analysis 
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We first offer one example of the methodology in which we analyzed the Manhattan project:  
Formally launched by the US Government in the summer of 1942, the Manhattan Project led 
to the design, development and use of the first atomic bombs against Japan in August 1945. In 
record time, engineers and scientist moved from the most meager laboratory data to working 
devices that constituted historical breakthroughs in the history of technology and opened the 
atomic age. Our study was interested in the Manhattan Project because it has long been 
incorrectly presented as the origin of modern project management (Lenfle & Loch, 2010). 
However, a close look at the management of the project reveals that most of the best practices 
of modern project management (PMI, 2008) are broken. As explained by the project director, 
L. Groves [1962, p. 19], “the whole endeavor was founded on possibilities rather than 
probabilities. Of theory there was a great deal, of proven knowledge, not much”. Therefore, 
they “decided almost at the very beginning (…) to abandon completely all normal orderly 
procedures in the development of the production plants » (ibid, p. 72). Thus, one cannot find 
in the Manhattan project the basics of project management because costs were unknown, 
planning was impossible, risk management was uncertain, etc. Moreover, the project strategy 
was originally compared to what contemporary textbooks are teaching. Indeed, to manage 
unforeseeable uncertainties, the project managers decided to adopt a parallel approach, i.e., to 
explore and implement simultaneously different technical solutions. This allowed the project 
to succeed in record time (see Hewlett & Anderson, 1962 or Rhodes, 1986 for a complete 
history of the case and Lenfle, 2011 for an analysis of the project strategy). What is 
interesting for our analysis are the following three matters: 
1. As opposed to the PMI model, instead of defining at the outset the requirements of the 
weapons which, given the scientific uncertainties, were impossible, the project 
steering committee explicitly decided to explore multiple scenarios. The goal was 
twofold, to adapt to the unknown and to reduce delivery time. 
2. The entire project was fundamentally an experimental learning process (Loch et al, 
2006). Each time there was a new problem (and there were many) they experimented, 
added new solutions (e.g., thermal diffusion to enrich uranium), explored different 
approaches simultaneously, attempted seemingly crazy ideas (e.g., implosion 
weapons), and adapted the project strategy accordingly. 
3. They could not rely on existing competencies because there were none. Thus, they had 
to build an entire industry almost from scratch. To do this, the army set up a dedicated 
organization with three pillars, the army corps of engineers, scientists and private 
firms (such as Du Pont, Union Carbide, Westinghouse, etc.). In this sense, the 
Manhattan Project offers the fundamental impetus for the military-industrial complex.  
Finally, the Manhattan Project violated project management best practices but was 
nevertheless considered a (technical) success. This success must be carefully evaluated; 
reducing Manhattan results to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the ensuing 
surrender of Japan is profoundly misleading (Lenfle, 2012). What is striking is that the 
Manhattan Project gives birth to lineages of new products that improved the initial design 
(ibid). Moreover, the project generated an extremely rich knowledge base in various fields 
(nuclear science and engineering, computing, science of explosives, etc.) that would later 
expand and be considered the cradle of the nuclear industry (military at first but also civilian). 
Finally, it also left behind organizations (mainly plants and laboratories) that survived in the 
postwar years through the Atomic Energy Commission, created August 1, 1946 (see Lenfle, 
2012). 
 
Our analysis of the unfolding and organization of the Manhattan Project case leads us to the 
following assessment on a five-level Likert scale. As shown in the table, this case is binary 
because it violates all the classical principles of project management (therefore scoring 1 on 
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rule-reuse criteria 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1) and, on the contrary, makes extensive use (5 on the Likert 
scale) of rule-renewing principles both for the following:  
– its managerial strategy (1.2 and 2.2);  
– its organization, which was continuously changing according to the project’s 
unfolding (3.2); and 
– its management (4.2), which had to constantly adapt to unforeseen events. 
Concerning the new “business” development criteria, there is no doubt about the construction 
of lineages of atomic weapons and the setting up of new organizations. Finally, there was (of 
course) no dominant design in this case, and the project constitutes the largest endeavor of 
WWII for the US Army (along with the development of the B29).    
 
 
 PM descriptors  
1 Risk management  
1.1 Organize a planned process that is robust to external events. 1 
1.2 The project organizes to identify unforeseeable uncertainties (unk unk) and/or the project organizes to increase the variance in the options. 5 
2 Project cost and resources associated to learning  
2.1 Project learning costs are related to tests and validation: alternatives are tested and evaluated and the relevant (or the best) one is kept. 1 
2.2 
Project learning (a) uses deviant explorations to be surprised by the results of such 
explorations and/or (b) uses systematic, comprehensive investigations and/or (c) uses a 
fuzzy front end, creative phase. 
5 
3 Coordination means to manage project and its environment  
3.1 Project team is integrated, stable and exhibits clear work division. The relationship with the external environment is well codified. 1 
3.2 
Project team (a) is able to commit new (initially external) actors to its network and/or (b) 
is able to change its own ecosystem by motivating external actors to create knowledge 
and competencies to contribute to the future lineage.  
5 
4 Managing target value  
4.1 The project target value is given by a clear list of requirements and well-defined specifications. 1 
4.2 Project target value (a) requires "sense-making" during the project and/or (b) is created during the project.  5 
 New business development criteria  
 There a family of products/services that is new and associated with the first project. 5 
 There is a new organization that contributes to the new business development. 5 
 Control variables  
 Is there an established dominant design at the beginning of the project in the project field? 1 
 What is the relative size of the project organization compared to the entire organization? 5 
 
4.2 Result 1: measurement model 
The measurement model associated with H1a and H2a is represented in figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: measurement model 
We conduct a confirmatory factor analysis (see results in table 2 below). Note that the case-
control study may cause violation of normality in situations of strong correlation between 
factors and cases. Thus, we rely on an alternative method to the classical (quasi-) MLEs 
estimation (or estimation by the variance-covariance matrix). We chose the so-called Satorra-
Bentler “robust” errors estimate, after (Satorra and Bentler 1994).  
The reported estimates are as follows: the estimated means of the data; loadings grouped by 
the latent variables; factor covariances; and variances of the error term. All parameters are 
freely estimated except for loadings used for identification, which have a coefficient estimate 
of 1 and are missing standard error.  
The final set of the displayed statistics includes likelihood ratios and two specific tests. The 
second test is displayed against an independence model. The first line is for a test against a 
saturated model (fit to the model). Note that in the case of the Satorra-Bentler estimation, the 
test of the goodness of fit with a likelihood-ratio is no more valid. Santorra and Bentler 
proposed Satterthwaite-type correction Tsc, and Tadj; the first corrects the scale and the 
second corrects the scale and the degrees of freedom. With this new estimation, the fit is good. 
These two tests are given in the two last lines.  
The second test shows that the current model is a significant improvement compared to the 
null model, in which variables are assumed to be independent. This confirms the 
multidimensionality of rule-reuse and rule-renewal design capabilities.  
The Tsc and Tadj tests show that the model fits well. In particular, the paths from the item to 
the factors are significant at a 5% level, which supports the convergent validity of the model.  
This result confirms H1a and H2a, i.e., a measurement model of design capabilities in project 
management that we built from the literature review and from the design theory perspective. 
This is a model based on two main factors, rule-reuse and rule-renewal design capabilities, as 
applied to a 4-facets invariant core of design rules.   
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Table 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis results 
4.3. Result 2: hypothesis testing 
We test the simple model represented below (figure 2) under two control variables, dominant 
design and relative size.  
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Figure 2: RR and RN design capabilities vs. new business development 
Following the CFA, we created two variables, RR and RN, both averages of the items they 
significantly load. When RR is superior (resp. inf.) to the 3.00 threshold, we consider that the 
project was RR_high (resp. RR_low); the same holds for RN.  
The control variables dominant design (DD) and relative size (relSize) are also coded in 0-1 
value at the threshold 3.00.  
The hypotheses are:  
H1b: The rule-reuse design capabilities are independent of new business creation.  
H2b: the rule-renewal design capabilities are positively related to new business creation.  
H1 and H2 remain true with the control factors dominant design and relative size.  
 
The result of the logistic regression are given below. They confirm H1 and H2, with the 
control factors.  
 
Table 2: Logistic regression for H1 and H2 (rule-based = RR, explo = RN) 
 
Only 4 projects are below the 3.0 threshold, XP-80 Jet Airplane of the Lockheed Skunk 
Works, the Polaris Missile, IBM 360 and IBM PC. In these cases, the projects are related to 
new business development, but they do not exhibit a high value for the rule-renewal factor. 
Returning to the detailed case studies, we found in all four cases the following interesting 
pattern: rule-renewal often preceded the project. In the case of Polaris (the first US submarine 
missile), there were previously many building blocks to realizing a missile, and, although 
there were many challenges for building a submarine-launched thermonuclear missile 
(including whether the new submarine missile appeared as a “new business” in itself), the 
rule-renewal could be limited to the design of a new, compact missile warhead and solid 
propellant. The case of IBM PC is even more interesting; the rule-renewal was actually made 
by other companies and research labs and the IBM project actually consisted in using the rule-
renewal capabilities made by others. Thus, IBM employed a strategy of open architecture 
using external components (Intel CPU, Microsoft OS, etc.). Thus, it is true that the project 
was not the place for rule-renewal; however, there was a (hidden) rule-renewal to obtain the 
new business development.  
These results confirm O’Connor's proposition because new business development (more 
generally, MI) is related to RN design capabilities (more generally, dynamic capabilities of a 
design system). These results also confirm a less-evident hypothesis because new business 
development can emerge equally in cases in which there are RR design capabilities or in cases 
in which there are not.    
 
4.4. Result 3: qualitative analysis 
These results lead us to identify several categories of projects (see data points below):  
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1- We find many projects (11) that are RR_low and RN_high. Project management was 
more oriented towards rule-renewal than rule-reuse and this might explain why they 
finally led to new business development. The most extreme project is the Manhattan 
Project, which exhibits the lowest score in rule-reuse and the highest in rule-renewal.  
2- We find in the upper right corner projects that are both RR_high and RN_high. These 
situations are more counterintuitive because they are good at reusing rules and renewing 
rules. How could these projects combine these opposite tendencies? We find three 
projects here, Edison Lighting System, Toyota Prius and Saint-Gobain Windshields with 
thin coating. When rereading the cases in detail, we find interesting patterns that might 
explain the positive relationship between RR design capabilities and RN design 
capabilities. In all three cases, we find series of projects or a portfolio of interdependent 
sub-projects. Each single sub-project is well driven with clear objectives (resources, 
specifications, delay, etc.), but the overall project itself is built for an exploratory purpose. 
For instance, one of the first Prius actions was a concept car for the Tokyo Motor Show 
and the concept car intended to explore certain customer values and technological 
alternatives. One of the sub-projects of Edison Lighting consisted of the development of 
demonstrators for Christmas mall lighting. Thus, the logic of efficient reuse is put to the 
service of exploration; it supports efficient, well-oriented exploration. This illustrates a 
form of “probe and learn” inside the entire project (Lynn et al., 1996).  
3- In the middle, we find projects in which there seems to be a trade-off between rule-reuse 
and rule-renewal. We find here multiple patterns.  
a. Low scores in rule-renewal may be explained by front-end exploration. For instance, 
the F117-Stealth Fighter and the Stealth family results from explorations run by 
university mathematicians (for wavelength reflections), by suppliers (surface 
structure to reflect radar wavelength), by the company and all its competitors (since 
the end of WW2, every military aircraft designer was working on low radar 
reflection) and by the “customer” (US army), who had the opportunity to learn by 
trying multiple proposals.  
b. We find also a logic of decoupling; the project is subdivided into several building 
blocks, and several are rule-reuse and others are more exploratory. This is clearly the 
case for Polaris, in which the vast majority of the tasks were rule based, except for 
the warhead (which precisely was not integrated into the PERT). There are similar 
patterns for Eiffel Tower, Baldwin and Kodak. Low-cost, transportable bridges in 
Eiffel Tower combine patterns a) and b); multiple preliminary explorations help to 
design well-delimited exploration areas inside the project in which exploration could 
be launched with limited risks (using steel instead of iron and new ways to throw the 
bridges, etc.);  
c. However, the logic of rule-reuse and the logic of rule-renewal can also lead to 
limitations in the rule-renewal or limited success in rule-reuse management. The 
domination of rule-reuse can avoid certain technological rule-renewals and, 
conversely, the unavoidable technological challenges might cause dramatic delays in 
the project (see IBM 360).  
 20 
 
Figure 3: RN and RR design capabilities for projects leading to new business development 
 
5- Discussion and managerial implications 
This paper adds to the literature on Major Innovation (MI) capabilities. We tested O’Connor's 
proposal that MI capabilities are a form of dynamic capability. We built an observation 
model; relying on design theories, we assimilated MI dynamic capabilities to rule-renewal 
design capabilities and non-MI dynamic capabilities to rule-reuse capabilities. We use this 
observation model on the specific case of projects leading (or not) to new business 
development in a case-control study based on 46 historical cases. This offers us three main 
results:  
1) We tested a measurement model of MI dynamic capabilities. MI dynamic capabilities 
can be assimilated to rule-renewal design capabilities, and these rule-renewal design 
capabilities can be measured in project management by four descriptors – renewal of 
the set of anticipated risks, renewal of the competencies, renewal of the project team 
members and project stakeholders, and renewal of the target value. By contrast, there 
are rule-reuse design capabilities that can be characterized as capabilities to stabilize a 
target value, to efficiently use a set of given competencies, to stabilize work divisions 
and to address well-anticipated risks. 
2) We tested the relationship between MI dynamic capabilities and MI success. More 
specifically, we tested that rule-renewal design capabilities in project management 
have a positive effect on new business creation, whereas rule-reuse design capabilities 
are independent of new business creation.  
3) We identified several types of combinations of rule-renewal design capabilities and 
rule-reuse design capabilities, which open interesting perspectives on the variety of 
forms of ambidextrous organizations (Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009; Raisch et al. 
2009) and on the management of projects (Loch et al. 2006). 
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There are, however, limits to these research results. The results are obtained in a specific 
observation system – namely a project that leads (or not) to new business creation, whereas 
O’Connor proposed, more generally, a model of MI dynamic capabilities at the firm level. For 
instance, our observation system leads us to neglect cases in which MI dynamic capabilities 
operate at the level of project portfolio management. This would require further research. 
However, this bias leads to underestimate the role of RN design capabilities in MI. This is a 
non-differential bias that leads to underestimate the relationship. If we prove the relationship 
despite the bias, the quality of the result is maintained. 
Beyond testing O’Connor's proposal, our study also confirms the interest of a theoretical 
background based on design theory, which helped to identify specific capabilities and thus to 
build reliable “descriptors” of the phenomena. Our research basically shows the interest of 
assimilating MI dynamic capabilities to rule-renewal (RN) design capabilities and to contrast 
these capabilities with rule-reuse (RR) design capabilities – which are also a form of design 
capabilities.  
A by-product of this research is also to underline the interest in relying on historical material, 
which brings detailed elements on project and a long-term perspective on the effects of one 
project on the development of an entire business.  
 
Managerial implications.  
These results have strong managerial implications:  
1- A first series of implications is obtained at the level of project management and new 
business development:  
a. It appears that project management can be a good way to organize for new 
business development, on the condition that it is clearly based on rule-renewal 
design capabilities. Project management may also be based on rule-reuse 
design capabilities, but it is not necessary and will require management of the 
combination rule-reuse and rule-renewal. This reinforces the growing body of 
work on the management of exploratory projects (Brady & Davis, 2004; Loch 
et al, 2006; Lenfle 2008 & 2011). 
b. The projects that do not follow rule-reuse principles are not necessarily bad. 
Therefore project evaluations must adopt a dual perspective. For instance, 
strongly rule-reuse projects should justify that they do not require renew rules 
and conversely strongly rule-renewal projects should justify that they are really 
unable to re-use any rule of the organization; they should be managed 
accordingly (Loch et al, 2006) 
c. This adds a new dimension to project management, the strategic capacity to 
combine rule-reuse and rule-renewal. Some of our cases echo previously 
known strategy, such as sequences of rule-reuse heading to rule-renewal,  
decoupling rule-reuse and rule-renewal in different projects tasks or modules, 
parallel rule-reuse projects providing pieces for rule-renewal, etc. These 
strategies might pave the way to new forms of project portfolio management or 
the management of platforms of projects.  
2- A second series of implications is at the level of MI dynamic capabilities:  
a. Rule-renewal (RN) design capabilities appear as a good proxy of MI dynamic 
capabilities. Even if our descriptors do not encompass all the aspects of MI 
dynamic capabilities, it clarifies a clear logic of MI management; it is oriented 
towards the renewal of a core of design rules, and it can be described by the 
following four specific forms of action and by contrast with more classical 
logic of rule-re-use design capabilities: a specific management of risk (capacity 
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to go beyond the set of fixed, pre-identified risks), a specific management of 
learning (capacity to acquire new competencies and not only reusing available 
competencies), a specific management of stakeholders (capacity to commit 
new stakeholders in the design process, instead of considering that the 
stakeholders should be committed right from the beginning) and a specific 
management of value (the capacity to design the target during the process, 
instead of relying on a given list of requirements). This approach synthesizes 
many proposals on exploration vs. exploitation and gives a clear and 
consistent logic of action based on the re-use or renewal of the set of design 
rules.  
b. This approach brings more firm ground to MI dynamic capabilities in a 
systemic approach. It appears that the “homeostasis” of the system, its 
equilibrium, may be a dynamic equilibrium, in the sense that the homeostasis 
is not based on keeping a stable set of design rules but is based on the 
controlled renewal of the core. The logic of rule-renewal is also the logic for 
managing the growth trajectory of the firm and its competencies, which 
balances rule-reuse and rule-renewal. It helps to go beyond the classical 
oppositions of exploration / exploitation – and beyond the “ambidextrous” 
approaches – by showing that these are less oppositional than complementary 
approaches and that the role of management is there precisely to balance them 
(Raisch et al., 2009) 
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